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Abstract–This study measures the impact of university-funded research and collaboration 
on scientific production of Canadian nanobiotechnology academics. This paper analyses a 
time-related model of the impact of academic research financing and network structure on 
research output measured by the number of papers and on the number of citations 
received by these publications. Results suggest that individual funding and a strong 
position in the past collaborative network has a positive effect on research output. In 
contrast to a number of studies, contracts are not found to have a negative influence on 
publication, quite the contrary. o impact of research funding is found on the number of 
citations received by an article. 
Index terms–Innovation networks, social network analysis, research funding, scientific 
articles 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The financing of university research is being scrutinised in Canada as governments increasingly 
demand measures of impact and outcomes from grant awarding bodies. As Gibbons et al. [27] 
suggest, the direction of research has migrated from a discipline-based science free of societal 
needs to a more demand driven science that must meet certain objectives. The integration of 
university research financing with government programmes aimed at the stimulation of 
innovation is a relatively recent phenomenon [40], but a strategy that is used more and more. 
This is especially true for domains seen as potential growth generators such as aerospace, 
biotechnology and lately nanotechnology. Innovation incentives such as R&D tax credits have 
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been put in place and university researchers have benefitted from increased links with industry as 
a consequence.  
Nanotechnology has potential applications in a wide range of domains, from nanomaterials to 
nanoelectronics, and from nanofoods to nanobiotechnology. Because of this intrinsic 
heterogeneity we have chosen to address nanobiotechnology, a field at the frontier of 
biotechnology and of nanotechnology. Nanobiotechnology innovation goes through different 
phases of development: from idea to output and finally to commercialisation. Each phase faces 
uncertainties, whether technological or commercial. For the first phase, from an idea to its 
output, the patience required and the uncertainties linked to the innovation process do not suit all 
types of fund providers [6], hence the importance of public research in these domains. As 
nanobiotechnology is a relatively new emerging technology, risks are inherent to its innovation 
process. Collaboration with university research centres contribute to reducing the uncertainties of 
innovation activities and thus the risks related to R&D projects. Public financing of research thus 
facilitates the production of knowledge and constitutes one of the key elements of the 
development of high-tech innovation. Research funding therefore enhances the success of 
innovation. 
A recent debate [56] on university research funding in Canada saw the “big 5” universities 
(University of British Columbia, University of Alberta, University of Toronto, University of 
Montreal and McGill University) argue that they should receive all (or the bulk of) the research 
funding, concentrate only on graduate training and leave undergraduate teaching to the other 
Canadian universities. The reason put forward was almost as simple as because we are the best 
at research. Although this proposal raised a wall of protestation in Canada, the question as to 
where does research funding has the most impact deserves an answer. In this article, we focus on 
the Quebec universities and compare the publication results obtained by two of the “big 5” 
(University of Montreal and McGill university) as a result of the research funding received. 
While public research grants are generally associated with wide scope projects, private contracts 
concentrate on short-term objectives aiming at the production of knowledge that can rapidly be 
used [30]. This paper aims at linking individual research grants and contracts to publication 
performance to measure the impact of nanotechnology research financing. Although it is not the 
prime aim of this paper to investigate whether contracts are detrimental to scientific publication 
performance, our model allows us to crudely contribute to the debate. All things being equal, we 
do not generally find that contracts have a negative effect on scientific production. 
Instead, the issue that this paper wishes to discuss is the effect of the interaction between 
research funding and collaboration, in particular the position of an individual scientist within her 
co-publication network, on individual scientific production. Using a panel data negative binomial 
regression model, we show that researchers in more central and cliquish positions, with a greater 
number and amount of grants and contracts, publish more. And that this is true regardless of the 
university from which the publications emanate. We then add a measure of quality to the 
quantity of publications, using an index of the number of citations received for the articles 
published estimated from a panel data random-effect regression model. This therefore aims to 
show that more substantial grants help researchers publish research of a better quality. 
This article thus integrates the literature on university research funding and on innovation 
networks. Using social network analysis of the co-authorship network of scientific articles, we 
aim to measure the spread of the nanotechnology knowledge base and its ramifications. Our goal 
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is then to estimate the influence of publicly and privately funded research on the production of 
scientific articles controlling for the position of the researchers as well as the university 
affiliation of the scientists. The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the 
conceptual framework including a brief review of the literature; section 3 presents the data and 
methodology; section 4 presents various summary statistics of the data; section 5 discusses the 
regression results; and finally, section 6 concludes. 
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Biotechnology is a relatively young discipline consisting of a number of specialised sub-
disciplines characterised by rapid knowledge diffusion [29]. A great number of scientific 
publications have been published in this domain during the last two decades. It is thus a 
multidisciplinary field that has created a rich pool of publications despite the fact that a large 
proportion of its knowledge base is mostly tacit and thus difficult to codify [2]. As technology 
permits and nanotechnology further develops, nanobiotechnology follows in the footsteps of 
biotechnology. Darby and Zucker [21] suggest that we can learn a great deal from the study of 
biotechnology and apply the findings to nanotechnology, as the two domains follow similar 
development and growth paths within two decades of each other. The observation of this rapid 
rate of growth in nanotechnology since 1990 is further supported by Bonaccorsi and Thoma [8]. 
Zucker et al. [63] insist on the necessity of collaboration between institutions to foster 
information exchange. Multi-project research centres force researchers and their universities to 
collaborate more efficiently using the diversity of resources available. Collaboration can indeed 
become a powerful lever to raise funds [20] and scientific collaboration and research funding are 
consequently intrinsically intertwined. If biotechnology research requires an important 
infrastructure in order to realise the projects that lead to the development of new products or 
processes, this is even more so for nanotechnology in general and thus for nanobiotechnology as 
well. Infrastructure investment not only consists of the acquisition of complex machines and 
instruments but also of the funds necessary for their operation and maintenance that requires 
specialised skilled personnel and logistics management to optimise access to this infrastructure. 
The creation of such a technological platform hence requires long-term investment in order to 
play its role as a space that fosters the emergence and fulfilment of new opportunities. Although 
universities and their affiliated research centres are the natural candidates for the localisation of 
such technological platforms, because their main goal is often to generate knowledge aimed at 
yielding technological innovation, the private sector should play an important role in their 
management and utilisation.  
Intuitively, most university research projects are financed from public funds [33]. Hart [35] 
recognises that public financing is increasingly targeted towards the development of innovation 
according to specific political guidelines; the main objective of these political guidelines being 
the creation and maintenance of competence centres within the university network. This network 
composed of universities and their affiliated research centres, is an integral part of the national 
system of innovation [34]. Within the national system of innovation, universities and their 
affiliated research centres play a crucial role in the innovation value chain that leads to economic 
growth [40], [62]. For instance, universities are an important incubator of new biotechnology 
firms [44]. Public research infrastructure generates technological knowledge that is transferred 
via pure externalities, entrepreneurship or contracts [58], [61]. University researchers facilitate 
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knowledge transfer between research laboratories and firms [5]. University spinoffs generate 
better innovations than large biotech firms [28]. Public research institutions play a key role both 
in the creation of new knowledge and of innovative local clusters of firms [23], [21], [60], [63] 
and in the retention of the most prolific researchers and students [26]. All these beneficial effects 
have a common origin: money and to a certain extent, collaborative work. 
Payne and Siow [47] as well as Blume-Kohout et al. [7] suggest that the augmentation in public 
financing that university science research has experienced in the last decade has had a 
tremendous effect on scientific output. Furthermore, public funding for specific projects can be 
perceived as a signal of quality not only for the funded researchers, but also for their university. 
Adams et al. [1] show that top universities and departments that have earned awards, have larger 
teams (with an increased scientific division of labour at the international level) and have more 
government funding. In our analysis, we should probably find a strong relationship between the 
number of collaborators, the number and the amount of grants, and the generation of new 
knowledge measured by the number of scientific articles. 
The granting of research money further act as a signal that attracts additional funding in 
subsequent years. Using a static model, Arora et al. [4] show that the publication track record of 
researchers has an influence on future grants and consequently on future publication levels as 
well. Zucker et al. [63] generally show the major impact that research financing has both on the 
publication of scientific articles and on patent production. A number of other scholars examine in 
greater details the number of publications emanating directly from specific grants. For instance, 
Payne and Siow [47] show that three years after receiving an instrumentation grant of one 
million dollars, between 8 and 11 new articles are generally published annually. Jacob and 
Lefgren [37] find that specific grants contribute to adding one additional publication with the 
five years subsequent to the attribution of the grant. 
In a field as close to its science base as nanobiotechnology, public financing should be seen as 
complementary to private contracts. Private funding has dramatically increased since 1985 [13] 
and so did university-industry research centres. University-industry research relations increase 
contact with scientists but lower communication between scientists and possibly shield their 
work from potentials future partners [57]. As a consequence, a greater proportion of contracts for 
a particular researcher could have a negative effect on her future scientific production. This 
could be due to the different reward process used in industrial and academic milieus [46], or to 
the short-termism associated with private contracts [30]. We expect to find that contracts have a 
negative effect or at least a lesser effect on the knowledge production. 
Knowledge used within these research institutions, is often appropriated from the publications 
generated by the research community [22]. Knowledge generated (output) by some scientists 
thus becomes knowledge appropriated (input) by other scientists. The notion of knowledge 
networks is clearly appropriate to the analysis of such a positive feedback, or virtuous circle, 
system. Their importance both in terms of economic growth and codified knowledge diffusion 
has been demonstrated [2], and a number of authors use social network analysis and network 
indicators emanating from graph theory to investigate the characteristics of groups of researchers 
[8]. Our research follows in their footsteps. 
Nanobiotechnology university scientists do not generally work in isolation but in relatively large 
multidisciplinary research groups. Research funding is therefore rarely attributed to a single 
scientist, but much more commonly to a research team, especially when the amounts are rather 
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large. The principle of collective invention as proposed by Allen [3] is very much a reality in this 
field. Lamoreaux and Sokoloff [39], Dahl and Pedersen [19], von Hippel [55] and Schrader [51] 
provide various examples of collective invention. This phenomenon is characterised by the free 
circulation of knowledge among socially connected agents. Social network analysis, as 
summarized by Cantner and Graf [11], has commonly been used to measure the degree of 
interrelatedness between these individuals [38]. 
Theoretical simulation studies have shown that knowledge diffusion is more efficient through 
clustered networks [15], and relatively cliquish networks [16]. The theoretical study of Cowan et 
al. [17] shows that network structure significantly influences the long-term production of 
knowledge. From an empirical point of view, Newman [44] shows that the probability of a 
particular scientist acquiring new collaborators increases with the number of his past 
collaborators, and that the probability of a pair of scientists collaborating increases with the 
number of other collaborators they have in common (the creation of a clique). Our paper 
examines these issues from an empirical point of view. 
A number of scholars claim that collaboration persistency through time also positively influence 
knowledge productivity. For instance, Cowan et al. [17] claim that previous collaborations 
increase the probability of a successful collaboration in the future. Furthermore, Fleming et al. 
[24] argue that an inventor’s past collaboration network will strongly influence subsequent 
productivity. 
Newman [42] compared the co-authorship network structures of four databases of scientific 
papers in physics, biomedical research and computer science. In a subsequent article, Newman 
[43] observed that for most scientists, the path linking them to other scientists goes through a 
relatively small number of very central individuals. These central individuals generally receive 
the most research funding. The question therefore is whether the position and funding of these 
individuals influence their knowledge production. These are issues that we wish to address in 
this paper. 
While the impact of network position and funding on scientific production seem obvious, can we 
extend this impact to the ‘quality’ of this research production? It is farfetched to actually link 
citations to the quality of the research. Bronmann and Daniel [10] wrote an excellent review of 
the division in two camps of the scientists interested in measuring impact: those that believe that 
citations are a useful assessment tool, and those that do not. Van Raan et al. [54], being part of 
the first group, suggest that high quality work should gain more citations from colleagues than 
low quality work. But what we really measure is the “utility within research” [52], the 
importance of scientific work [31] and its impact [25], [14] not necessarily its quality, citations 
are proxies [18]. Taking into considerations the doubts of the other camp (see for example [59]), 
we will treat the number of citations as a measure of the usefulness of a publication. 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This project requires the integration of two sources of information, individual university 
researchers’ funds and their position in the network of nanotechnology scientists. Two databases 
are used for this project: Elsevier’s Scopus and the Système d’information sur la recherche 
universitaire (SIRU) of the Quebec ministry of education, leisure and sports. Scopus provides 
the necessary data on nanobiotechnology scientific articles (date of publication, co-authors and 
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their affiliations), where nanotechnology is defined by a keyword search similar to that of Porter 
et al. [48]. We define nanobiotechnology the articles that are in the intersection between 
biotechnology (from previous research) and nanotechnology research. We have extracted all 
scientific articles relating to nanobiotechnology for which at least one Canadian-affiliated 
scientist contributed for the period 1952-2006. SIRU contains the grants and contracts during the 
period 1985-2005 of all Quebec university scientists, from which we extracted information for 
the nanobiotechnology scientists identified in the article search. The data for each scientist 
provides their affiliation as well as the yearly amount received from each grant or contract 
registered with the university1. Merging the two databases required the careful examination of 
the surnames and first names (in SIRU) or initials (in Scopus) of scientists and their affiliations 
in both databases2. The intersection of the two databases results in the scientific production and 
financing of all Quebec biotechnology academics. 
Using the social network analysis software Pajek, we then build the network of co-authors using 
co-publication links between scientists. In these networks, the vertices are the co-authors or 
scientists and the edges between the vertices represent the co-authorship links of each article. In 
order to follow the evolution of collaboration over the years, we have created sub-networks using 
the co-publication links over periods of 3 years and 5 years. An analysis of these sub-networks 
enabled us to describe their structural properties and to explore the collaborative behaviour of 
nanobiotechnology scientists in Quebec.  
Our measures of network attributes focus on a scientist’s position within the network: degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality and individual cliquishness. Degree centrality of a vertex 
(scientist), or simply the degree of the vertex, is defined as the number of co-authors of a 
scientist in each sub-network [degcentind]. The scientists with the highest values of degree 
centrality are found in the most central positions of the network. They are directly connected to 
more scientists and thus have access to more potential knowledge sources and have better 
opportunities to spread knowledge. Betweenness centrality of a vertex (scientist) refers to the 
capacity of a scientist to link two other scientists from the same sub-network through the 
smallest number of intermediaries [betcentind]. If a greater proportion of the shortest paths 
between all other vertices “goes through” a particular vertex, this vertex has a higher 
betweenness centrality and her role as an intermediary is more important. Finally, cliquishness of 
a vertex is measured by the egocentric density of a vertex which is defined as the fraction of all 
pairs of the immediate neighbours of a vertex that are also directly connected to each other. The 
cliquishness [cliqueind] basically measures the likelihood that two vertices that are connected to 
a specific third vertex are also connected to one another, hence forming a clique. 
One remaining question concerning the network measures relate to the time period covered by 
these networks. In other words, what is the historical structure of the collaboration that we 
should consider? One the one hand, public grants are generally awarded for a number of years. 
For example, Tier I Canada research chairs are generally awarded for periods of 7 years (5 years 
for Tier II chairs). Ordinary research grants vary from 3 to 5 years. Other major collaborative 
                                                 
1 A number of Quebec scientists own small company through which they perform consultative work. We have no 
means by which to estimate the breadth of such a practice but estimate it to be relatively small compared to the bulk 
of the funding received through the official channels, because of the very nature of biotechnology research. 
2 A common ambiguity in the Scopus database consists in attributing all the affiliations in a paper to each and 
everyone of the scientists.  
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grants cover 7 years of funding while smaller initiatives can be awarded for periods as short as 
one year. On the other hand, in the literature, the time period of collaborative networks vary from 
one study to the next. For instance, Schilling and Phelps [50] use three-year windows for their 
firm collaborative networks. Gulati and Gargiulo [32] prefer five-year windows and so does 
Stuart [53] but with a one-year lag. As a consequence, during the course of our analysis, 3- and 
5-year sub-networks have been considered and the most robust results will be reported in this 
paper. 
As mentioned above, one of the goals of the project consists in determining whether more 
innovation in generated by researchers with a greater number of grants or contracts and in more 
central positions. Our model will therefore be the following: 
 
Ait = α + βG #nbgrantXit − l + βGSavergrantXit − l
+βC #nbcontXit − l + βCSavercontXit − l
+βC #nbcontXit − l × d91−93 + βCSavercontXit −l × d91−93




∑ + δ td85−95 + ν i + εit
 (III.1) 
where Ait represents the number of articles of scientist i in year t; nbgrantXit-l is the number of 
grants obtained by scientist i from years t-l-X3 to t-l; avergrantXit-l is the average yearly amount 
of grants (deflated by the consumer price index) obtained by scientist i from the years t-l-X to t-l; 
nbcontXit-l is the number of contracts obtained by scientist i from years t-l-X to t-l; avercontXit-l is 
the average yearly amount of contracts (deflated by the consumer price index) obtained by 
scientist i from the years t-l-X to t-l; d9193 is a time dummy variable that takes the value 0 for the 
period 1991-1993 where a surprising amount of contracts were awarded and the value 1 
otherwise, this interactive dummy therefore aims at removing these problematic years for the 
contracts; I Iimt represent the characteristic m of the network position of scientist i in year t [m 
being degcentind  or betcentind  and cliqueind  and   taking the value 3 for here-year 
networks and 5 for five-year networks]; dUiu are dummy variables for the university u to which 
scientist i belongs4; d85-95 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for the period 1985-1995
5; and 
υi + εit is the error term.  
Fig. 1 shows that for the period 1991-1993, trend in contracts increases dramatically. According 
to Yves Gingras of the Observatoire des Sciences et Technologies, this corresponds to a period 
where a loophole in the law was overexploited by firms. The interactive dummy variable, d91-93, 
simply removes these problematic years from the regression. Other interactive dummy structures 
were investigated but the results were not as good as this simpler method. 
Our analysis has considered a lag structure of 1-, 2- and 3-year lags for most variables of the 
model, similar to what [50] have used in their model. We have tested all combinations of lags 
and the most robust results combine 1- and 2-year lags. Only the most robust results are 
                                                 
3 X represents either 3 or 5 years; l represents yearly lags of 1 or 2 years. 
4 We have not yet tracked down all the migrations of scientists across universities. So in this model, scientists are 
affiliated to their most common university. 
5 1996 marks the year when Scopus increased significantly the number of journals covered. This period also 
corresponds to the moment when university reporting the ministry of education became compulsory. 
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presented in the paper. This panel data negative binomial regression model is estimated using the 
xtnbreg procedure of Stata 10. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Average amount of contracts (constant
6
 Canadian dollars of 2002) received per scientist per year 
A second model will take into consideration the number of citations received within the first 
three, five and seven years of publication, nbcitY, Y taking the value 3, 5 or 7. This measure will 
therefore replace Ait in equation (1). Although this may seem as a relatively short period to 
cumulate citations, this allows us to include the publications of 2004 and examine 20 years of 
nanotechnology research (from 1985-20047). A number of variations of this measure were used. 
First, a very crude measure will sum the total number of citations received in the three to seven 
years following publication of the articles published by an individual in a given year and take the 
natural log of the total. A second variation using a relative index, comparing the total amount of 
citations received three to seven years following publication of the articles published by an 
individual in a given year divided by the mean of this value was also examined8. These models 
will be estimated using the xtreg procedure of Stata 10. 
                                                 
6 All amounts of funds have been deflated by the consumer price index, CPI. 
7 For citations 7 years after publications, the sample will of course stop in 2002). 
8 A number of variations of the dependent variable were used for instance the average number of citations per 
article, and normalised values dividing each measure by the mean of the university, cluster or country. None of these 














nbcitYit = α + λa Ait + βG #nbgrantXit − l + βGSavergrantXit −l
+βC #nbcontXit − l + βCSavercontXit − l
+βC #nbcontXit − l × d91−93 + βCSavercontXit − l × d91−93[ ]




∑ + δ td85−95 + ν i + ε it
 (III.2) 
Because we are interested in the effect that universities may play on the performance of 
individuals, a fixed effect model is not appropriate as the vast majority of our scientists do not 
migrate from one university to another and hence, these dummy variables are time-invariant. 
These time-constant variables are thus perfectly correlated with the dummy variables used for 
the fixed-effects. The random-effect model does not have this problem. The use of the random-
effect model must however be tested using the Breusch-Pagan test [9] as well as the Hausman 
[36] specification test. Unfortunately, the Hausman specification test systematically rejected the 
random-effect model when using the relative index as a dependent variable, and as a 
consequence this model will not be presented here. In addition, although were replicated the 
analysis for three-, five- and seven-year citations, only the five-year citation regressions will be 
presented in this chapter as the results are similar. 
IV. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Before turning to the regression results, let us first briefly present the descriptive statistics of 
some of the variables that will be used in these regressions. Our two dependent variables, the 
number of articles published and the number of citations they have received, are presented in 
Fig. 2 and 3. Because we are interested in two of the ‘big 5’ universities in the country, McGill 
University and the University of Montreal are included in both pictures. As the field of 
nanobiotechnology developed, the number of articles and of citations has considerably increased 
over the years. McGill University clearly dominates in terms of scientific production (in the 
recent part of the sample) and in terms of the quality of the research produced. For the university 
of Montreal though, the picture is not that of a world leader in the field. Further information is 




Fig. 2 Average number of articles published per year 
 
 
Fig. 3 Average number of citations received for the articles published at time t, in the five years 
following publication 
Examining the average amount of research funds granted to individual researchers (Fig. 4), we 
































year than their colleagues in other universities. Then, with the recruitment of new professors and 
the use of the Canadian foundation for innovation (CFI), the University started to build 
considerable research infrastructure. The recent increase in scientific production is probably 
attributable to this investment. Unfortunately, citations do not appear to follow this trend. Could 
it be that the research infrastructure in place also contributes to industry in the form of more 
applied research, and hence less ‘citable’? Fig. 5 indicates that researchers from the University of 
Montreal have received on average more industrial contracts than McGill or the other 
universities (with the notable exception of Laval University). This would tend to suggest more 
applied work for/with industry. 
Turning now to the network measures, we find that there has been a tendency towards 
convergence of the average degree and betweenness centrality as well as of cliquishness (Fig. 6). 
As more scientists enter the field of nanobiotechnology, the average network measures decrease. 
From 2003, however, the trend seems to be reversing as collaboration becomes established and 
the newly arrived scientists get better integrated in the network. More research is needed to 
establish whether this is a steady trend.  
 
 















Fig. 5 Average amount of public (Operating costs and Infrastructure grants) and private (Contracts) 
funds received (in constant Canadian dollars of 
Fig. 6 Average degree centrality for three
degcent5), betweenness centrality (10 000 x 
year 
The regressions to be considered estimate the factors that influence researcher productivity in 
terms of the number of articles (the results are shown in Table 1). Only the most robust 
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V. RESULTS 
















variety of lag structures was tested (one-, two- and three-lags) in order to investigate the most 
appropriate time lags for each variable. The results shown in Table 1 are those for which the 
coefficient obtained for each variable is the most significant (two-year lags were found to be 
more appropriate for public grants, while one-year lags yielded more robust results for 
contracts).  
Table 1 presents the results of 6 regression models, using a number of variables to represent 
grants, contracts and network position indicators. To facilitate interpretation, the coefficients are 
presented as incidence rate ratios (IRR). For instance, in model (1), if a researcher were to 
receive one more grant in a period of three years, his rate of articles would be expected to 
increase by a factor 1.0073, while holding all other variables in the model constant. The 
interpretation for the variables for which we have taken the natural logarithm is slightly different. 
Considering from Table 3 that the average value for the log of avergrant3 is about 12.3, a one 
unit increase in the log, the rate of articles would thus be expected to rise by a factor of 1.006, 
ceteris paribus. Nearly all variables included in the 6 models, have a positive effect on the yearly 
production of scientific articles. 
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Table 1 – Regression results – number of articles per author per year 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
nbgrant3t-2 1.0073 *** 1.0068 *** 1.0087 ***       
 (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0014)        
nbgrant5t-2       1.0052 *** 1.0047 *** 1.0061 *** 
       (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  
ln(avergrant3t-2) 1.0068 * 1.0053  1.0066 *       
 (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)        
ln(avergrant5t-2)       1.0075 ** 1.0059  1.0075 * 
       (0.0038)  (0.0038)  (0.0039)  
nbcont3t-1 1.0110 *** 1.0108 *** 1.0114 *** 1.0108 *** 1.0107 *** 1.0111 *** 
 (0.0028)  (0.0029)  (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0029)  (0.0028)  
ln(avercont3t-1) 1.0006  1.0007  1.0014  1.0004  1.0005  1.0011  
 (0.0029)  (0.0030)  (0.0030)  (0.0029)  (0.0030)  (0.0030)  
nbcont3t-1 x d9193 0.9920 * 0.9927 * 0.9917 ** 0.9920 * 0.9927 * 0.9917 ** 
 (0.0042)  (0.0042)  (0.0042)  (0.0042)  (0.0042)  (0.0042)  
ln(avercont3t-1) x d9193 1.0209 *** 1.0150 *** 1.0202 *** 1.0208 *** 1.0153 *** 1.0201 *** 
 (0.0051)  (0.0051)  (0.0051)  (0.0051)  (0.0051)  (0.0051)  
104 x degcentind3t-1 1.0368 ***     1.0368 ***     
 (0.0024)      (0.0024)      
104 x degcentind5t-1   1.0416 ***     1.0415 ***   
   (0.0026)      (0.0026)    
104 x betcentind3t-1     1.0074 ***     1.0074 *** 
     (0.0006)      (0.0006)  
ln(103 x cliquind3t-2) 1.0564 *** 1.0446 *** 1.0903 *** 1.0564 *** 1.0449 *** 1.0905 *** 
 (0.0112)  (0.0114)  (0.0114)  (0.0112)  (0.0114)  (0.0114)  
dULaval 1.0868 * 1.0804 * 1.0844 * 1.0854 * 1.0783  1.0828 * 
 (0.0510)  (0.0508)  (0.0523)  (0.0509)  (0.0507)  (0.0522)  
dMcGill 1.0840 * 1.0763  1.0854 * 1.0853 * 1.0776  1.0862 * 
 (0.0507)  (0.0502)  (0.0522)  (0.0507)  (0.0503)  (0.0522)  
dConcordia 1.0194  1.0307  1.0219  1.0207  1.0313  1.0235  
 (0.1064)  (0.1069)  (0.1106)  (0.1067)  (0.1072)  (0.1109)  
dSherbrookeBishop 1.0816  1.0516  1.0812  1.0811  1.0509  1.0809  
 (0.0740)  (0.0722)  (0.0757)  (0.0740)  (0.0721)  (0.0757)  
dUQuebec 0.9885  0.9805  0.9916  0.9871  0.9782  0.9903  
 (0.0528)  (0.0524)  (0.0543)  (0.0528)  (0.0523)  (0.0543)  
d1985-1995 0.7018 *** 0.7330 *** 0.6959 *** 0.7105 *** 0.7383 *** 0.7060 *** 
 (0.0197)  (0.0213)  (0.0198)  (0.0203)  (0.0216)  (0.0203)  
ln(r) 2.7694  2.8251  2.6557  2.7686  2.8223  2.6547  
 (0.0818)  (0.0843)  (0.0796)  (0.0818)  (0.0843)  (0.0796)  
ln(s) 1.2627  1.3001  1.1324  1.2642  1.2991  1.1346  
 (0.0677)  (0.0697)  (0.0635)  (0.0676)  (0.0695)  (0.0635)  
             
n 10039  9775  10039  10042  9778  10042  
ngroups 1168  1162  1168  1168  1162  1168  
average nb years 8.6  8.4  8.6  8.6  8.4  8.6  
max nb years 17  16  17  17  16  17  
Log likelihood -15457.6 *** -15091.9 *** -15491.7 *** -15462.5 *** -15097.8 *** -15497.0 *** 
Wald χ2 720.34  670.78  635.32  721.37  668.87  635.04  
LR test vs pooled:  1453.51 *** 1399.07 *** 1793.44 *** 1455.23 *** 1404.85 *** 1795.8 *** 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 Standard errors are presented in parentheses 





The results on contracts do not have the expected negative effect anticipated from the literature, 
if we were to assume that scientists that obtain industry contracts patent or are distracted by very 
applied or less publishable research. This does not seem to the be the case as the number of 
contracts has a positive effect on the number of publications while the amount received on 
average does not influence the publication level. This may be a field effect. Indeed 
nanobiotechnology is still in its infancy and as such is still very much embedded in the scientific 
world. Although this is a speculation, research would appear to be closer to fundamental science 
than to applied science in this very narrow field. The results for nanotechnology in general do 
not yield consistent results and we are currently in the process of distinguishing the various 
subfields that compose nanotechnology to disentangle the ‘closeness-to-market’ effect in the 
fundamental versus applied science. 
Regarding the position of individual scientists in the co-publication network, our results show a 
strong and positive influence of centrality (both degree centrality and betweenness centrality) 
and cliquishness. More central individuals publish more papers, whether he had more 
collaborators in the past (degree centrality) or is in a better intermediary position (betweenness 
centrality). For a start, more central researchers have a wider network of collaborators. With the 
tendency in recent years to dramatically increase the number of co-authors on scientific articles, 
this can contribute to increasing the number of articles of each individual. In addition, past 
individual cliquishness also accounts for an increase in productivity. 
As for the debate on the ‘big 5’ universities in Canada, of which two are located in Quebec 
(McGill University and University of Montreal), we cannot say that our results support their 
claim, certainly not in terms of scientific production. The omitted dummy variable is for the 
University of Montreal (including the affiliated engineering school Ecole Polytechnique of 
Montreal), to which the results should be compared. Being located at McGill University or Laval 
University (in Quebec city), contribute to increasing a scientists’ productivity by more than 8% 
compared with the University of Montreal. These results are however weakly significant and not 
robust throughout the 6 models presented. Further investigation is therefore required regarding 
this debate. We can say that there is no evidence so far that researchers from the two ‘best’ 
universities in Quebec publish ‘more’ than their colleagues in other universities in the province. 
The ‘publish or perish game’ is the same for all universities and researchers conform to it. The 
argument put forward in Wells’ [56] article by the five top university presidents is that they 
should be allowed to “pursue world-class scientific research and train the most capable graduate 
students”.  
Work that is more cited is one way of verifying whether they already pursue more world-class 
research. We have already shown from the elementary statistics that McGill University generally 
produces work that is more cited than that of other universities (see Fig. 3). But does that mean 
that more money is required to produce such world-class research? Is it sufficient to pour money 
into a research group to make it produce highly cited world-class research? Our results 
(presented in Table 2) would tend to say no; neither the number of grants, nor the average 
amount of grants received per year averaged over three or five years yield very significant 
results. We have tested the introduction into the model of the interactive dummy variables d91-93 
to take into account the loophole in the law, as in Table 1, but neither contract variables are 
significant. These results are presented in Table 5 in the annex to this paper. The number of 
grants received over a period of three years is positive but weakly significant. In addition, the 
number and amount of contracts obtained by researchers do not influence the number of citations 
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either. Hence money does not seem to matter. Since a large part of the grants are devoted to 
student stipends and other research assistant salaries, and that these salaries are generally fixed 
by the grant awarding bodies, there is not much difference across universities in terms of salaries 
and stipends. As a consequence, it is not surprising that the amount of research money at the 
disposal of researchers does not seem to have an influence on citations.  
What seems to matter is the intrinsic characteristic of researchers. Our model tries to take this 
into account using four variables. The first one refers to the number of papers a scientist 
publishes. Intuitively, the more papers a scientist produces, the more citations he is likely to get. 
The second and third measures relate to the past position of a researcher in the co-publication 
network: degree centrality and betweenness centrality. The fourth measure is also a network 
measure: cliquishness.  
Let us first examine the number of papers published. When estimating linear regressions using 
panel data, one has to determine whether a fixed-effect or a random effect model is more 
appropriate. In our case, the vast majority of researchers do not change university in the course 
of their career. As a consequence, each university dummy variable is nearly constant within each 
group (scientist). A fixed-effect model is therefore not appropriate as the time-constant variables 
are correlated with the dummy variables used for the fixed-effects. Random-effects do not have 
this problem. Having said that, once still has to verify that the random effect is the most 
appropriate using the test devised by Breusch and Pagan [9] and the Hausman [36] specification 
test. While we had not problems with rejecting the Breusch-Pagan test, the Hausman 
specification test proved trickier. We had to use the old trick of replacing the variables which 
exhibit the largest differences between the fixed- and random-effects models by their within and 
between effects. In other words, replacing the troublesome variables by their mean across time 
(within effect) for each subject and the deviance from that mean (between effect). 
For the number of papers, the variable nbpapert is replaced by averpapert and nbpapert - 
averpapert. In a sense, the within effect takes into consideration the intrinsic quality of a 
researcher. Both variables are positive and significant in the regressions 7 to 12. The results for 
both measures of degree centrality (for three- and five-year networks) show counterintuitive 
results. While its average value (averdegcentind3t-1 and averdegcentind5t-1) yields positive and 
significant values, implying that a more central individual in the past is more likely to get more 
citations in the future, the coefficient of its deviation is negative and significant. Once a 
researcher has reached some kind of notoriety and has collaborated with a greater number of 
colleagues, his number of citations does not augment with the introduction of one more 
collaborator. We would have expected that the migration from the periphery of the network to its 
center, hence some kind of recognition of quality, would have a positive effect on future 
citations. Hence there appears to be a limit with the number of people with whom a person can 
collaborate in terms of its effect on recognition by peers. This result is partly in agreement with 
Sandström et al. [49] who show that researchers are more likely to cite authors with whom they 
are personally acquainted, hence that social networks matter. The same is true for betweenness 
centrality. Cliquishness does not however produce robust results across the models as it is only 
significant for models (9) and (12). Its effect is nevertheless positive on the number of citations.  
17 
 
Table 2 – Random-effects regression results – natural log of the number of citations five-years after 
publication 
 (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  
averpapert 
0.1873 *** 0.1963 *** 0.2677 *** 0.1882 *** 0.1971 *** 0.2687 *** 
(0.0234)  (0.0228)  (0.0230)  (0.0235)  (0.0229)  (0.0230)  
nbpapert - averpapert 
0.2056 *** 0.2064 *** 0.2050 *** 0.2058 *** 0.2067 *** 0.2053 *** 
(0.0081)  (0.0081)  (0.0081)  (0.0081)  (0.0081)  (0.0081)  
nbgrant3t-2 
0.0038 * 0.0039 * 0.0039 *       
(0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0022)        
nbgrant5t-2 
      0.0021  0.0021  0.0022  
      (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0015)  
ln(avergrant3t-2) 
-0.0031  -0.0036  -0.0049        
(0.0065)  (0.0065)  (0.0065)        
ln(avergrant5t-2) 
      -0.0056  -0.0061  -0.0071  
      (0.0068)  (0.0068)  (0.0069)  
nbcont3t-1 
-0.0020  -0.0021  -0.0021  -0.0019  -0.0020  -0.0020  
(0.0037)  (0.0037)  (0.0037)  (0.0037)  (0.0037)  (0.0037)  
ln(avercont3t-1) 
-0.0033  -0.0031  -0.0029  -0.0029  -0.0027  -0.0025  
(0.0040)  (0.0040)  (0.0040)  (0.0040)  (0.0040)  (0.0040)  
104 x averdegcentind3t-1 
0.0452 ***     0.0452 ***     
(0.0089)      (0.0089)      
104 x (degcentind3t-1 - 
averdegcentind3t-1 
-0.0087 *     -0.0086 *     
(0.0046)      (0.0046)      
104 x averdegcentind5t-1 
  0.0362 ***     0.0363 ***   
  (0.0076)      (0.0076)    
104 x (degcentind5t-1 – 
averdegcentind5t-1 
  -0.0127 **     -0.0126 **   
  (0.0051)      (0.0051)    
104 x averbetcentind3t-1 
    0.0017      0.0016  
    (0.0029)      (0.0029)  
104 x (betcentind3t-1 - 
averbetcentind3t-1 
    -0.0023 *     -0.0023 * 
    (0.0012)      (0.0012)  
ln(103 x cliquind3t-2) 
0.0227  0.0255  0.0404 ** 0.0235  0.0263  0.0412 *** 
(0.0195)  (0.0196)  (0.0185)  (0.0195)  (0.0196)  (0.0185)  
dULaval 
-0.0467  -0.0466  -0.0674  -0.0455  -0.0455  -0.0661  
(0.0626)  (0.0627)  (0.0640)  (0.0627)  (0.0628)  (0.0640)  
dMcGill 
0.2218 *** 0.2198 *** 0.2170 *** 0.2227 *** 0.2207 *** 0.2181 *** 
(0.0602)  (0.0604)  (0.0617)  (0.0604)  (0.0605)  (0.0618)  
dConcordia 
0.1508  0.1698  0.1838  0.1462  0.1650  0.1801  
(0.1505)  (0.1507)  (0.1558)  (0.1508)  (0.1509)  (0.1560)  
dSherbrookeBishop 
-0.1389  -0.1390  -0.1486  -0.1369  -0.1370  -0.1465  
(0.0891)  (0.0893)  (0.0910)  (0.0893)  (0.0894)  (0.0911)  
dUQuebec 
-0.1966 *** -0.1962 *** -0.2087 *** -0.1954 *** -0.1950 *** -0.2073 *** 
(0.0756)  (0.0758)  (0.0771)  (0.0757)  (0.0759)  (0.0771)  
d1985-1995 
-0.3196 *** -0.3201 *** -0.3028 *** -0.3196 *** -0.3200 *** -0.3022 *** 
(0.0457)  (0.0457)  (0.0459)  (0.0460)  (0.0460)  (0.0463)  
constant 
2.5880 *** 2.5830 *** 2.5795 *** 2.6122 *** 2.6071 *** 2.6003 *** 
(0.0943)  (0.0948)  (0.0967)  (0.0959)  (0.0965)  (0.0985)  
             
σu 0.4815  0.4843  0.5066  0.4833  0.4859  0.5079  
σe 0.7890  0.7887  0.7889  0.7890  0.7886  0.7888  
ρ 0.2713  0.2738  0.2920  0.2729  0.2751  0.2931  
             
n 3400  3400  3400  3402  3402  3402  
ngroups 748  748  748  748  748  748  
average nb years 4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5  
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 (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  
max nb years 16  16  16  16  16  16  
R2 within 0.1970  0.1977  0.1967  0.1970  0.1977  0.1967  
R2 between 0.3722  0.3693  0.3420  0.3721  0.3694  0.3420  
R2 overall 0.3337  0.3331  0.3289  0.3329  0.3323  0.3280  
υi~Gaussian Wald 
χ2(15) 
1165.78  1162.95  1113.28  1163.94  1161.39  1112.17  
corr(υi,X) 0  0  0  0  0  0  
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 Standard errors are presented in parentheses 
 
Going beyond the individual quality of scientists, the five university dummy variables for any 
the local environment of the individual researchers. The omitted dummy variable is for the 
University of Montreal. As a consequence, all things being equal, McGill university scientists 
receives more citations than University of Montreal. In contrast, universities from the University 
of Quebec network receive less citations than University of Montreal. Although our results 
clearly identify McGill as world-class (positive and significant effect on the number of citations), 
we cannot distinguish the University of Montreal from the other universities with the exception 
of the universities from the University of Quebec network which yields a negative and 
significant result. Despite the fact that the coefficients are not significant for these other 
universities, their sign raise an interesting question: Is there a language or culture bias as 
suggested by Carpenter and Narin [12] and Menou [41]? Indeed, the other French speaking 
university from Montreal, University Condordia, also yields a positive albeit non-significant 
value. Our research cannot investigate this claim properly, but it is certainly an avenue of 
research worth pursuing. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this paper, we set out to investigate whether the funding of research as well 
as the organisation (read collaboration or co-authorship) of research has an impact on the output 
from this research. A second goal of this research was to contribute to the on-going debate in 
Canada about the ‘big 5’ claiming that they should concentrate on graduate teaching and world-
class research, leaving undergraduate teaching to other universities. 
To the first question, the answer is overwhelmingly ‘yes there is an impact’, but there are 
subtleties. While more research funds undoubtedly lead to more scientific articles, the 
relationship with citations is inexistent. The same is true for the number of grants as opposed to 
the total amount of funds obtained. When we turn to contracts, which are generally associated 
with more applied research, we do not find a negative impact on the scientific production, quite 
the opposite. More numerous contracts increase the number of articles in a non negligible way. 
The articles resulting from this research however probably do not lead to world-class research as 
there is not significant effect from either the number or the amount of contracts received on the 
number of citations obtained. The effect would have been more decisive if the coefficient had 
been negative and significant. We suspect that the type of contract might play a role in 
discerning which ones lead to more recognised research. While our data does not permit this type 
of analysis at present, we are currently investigating patent-paper-pairs and papers co-authored 
with industry to try to identify a difference among the papers that stem from research contracts.  
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Since the amount of research funds at the disposal of researchers does not yield a convincing 
story, the intrinsic quality of researchers must play the most fundamental role. This latent 
variable, a scientist’ quality, cannot be directly measured, but a number of proxies were used in 
our analysis. If one agrees that in a field like nanobiotechnology where innovation increasingly 
requires multidisciplinary teams, innovating alone is no longer possible, then the most 
‘important’ scientists would occupy the most central positions within the co-authorship 
networks. Hence degree centrality and betweenness centrality can act as proxies for researcher’ 
quality in our impact regressions. Both measures have an impact on scientific productivity (the 
number of articles) and on the quality of this research (the number of citations).  
So what does this tell us? The best universities have a tremendous attracting power for the best 
scientists, if only because they also recruit the best students. These students are not better paid 
whether they enrol in a top university or in another institution, so money does not seem to matter 
to produce world-class research. In addition, because with more funds, more research students 
can be recruited, this has a direct incidence on the number of articles published, but not on the 
quality of this research. Now regarding our contribution to the Canadian debate. While McGill 
University certainly stands out, our assessment of University of Montreal in the field of 
nanobiotechnology does not single it out as a world-class university. This is not to say that in 
other fields, the University of Montreal does not offer a top performance.  
There is a number of limitations to our research to which we aim to remedy in the future. First, 
we have examined a rather narrow field, nanobiotechnology. In order to fully support the claims 
of two of the big 5 universities in Quebec, we would have to assess all the disciplines in which 
both universities specialise. This is not the goal of our research.  
A second limitation concerns the mobility of scientists. Once a scientist moves out of the 
province, he disappears from our funding radar. We can partially measure the amount of federal 
funding received by these researchers in the rest of Canada, but contracts and provincial grants 
are not available, which obviously would lead to a biased picture of the impact of publicly 
funded research. Scientists from the rest of Canada would appear to produce more with less 
funds! A potential solution to that would be to gain access to the curriculum vitae of these 
researchers and hope that they are complete. We will investigate with the three granting agencies 
in Canada whether this is possible. 
A third limitation of our study is the data. Although we have tried to extract as much of the 
articles of the researchers identified in the intersection between the nanotechnology and the 
biotechnology fields, it is possible that some escaped our net. For instance, Scopus does not 
include all scientific journals and as more journals are added every year, the coverage changes 
constantly. As a consequence, the citation measures suffer in accuracy especially towards the 
beginning of the sample.  
In addition, what our model cannot measure however is the impact of graduate students on the 
production of a research team. Furthermore, we have not yet been able to reconstitute research 
groups that transcend universities apart from co-publications. The data available to us via SIRU 
does include a title of the project funded by the contract or the grant. Unfortunately since this 
information comes from numerous sources (i.e. from each university), there is no consistency in 
the reporting. The title of a particular project thus differs across universities. We are 
investigating data mining techniques that would allow to reconcile these data and hence 
reconstitute, so to speak, the original teams. Adding to those the students that are funded through 
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scholarships would allow us to measure the funding received by particular laboratories or 
research teams. This is however a very complex data matching exercises which require careful 
screening. We have only scratched the surface, there remains a great deal of work to be done. 
APPENDIX 
 
Table 3 –  Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
nbcit5 5837 50.937 76.324 1.000 1458.000 
nbpapert 5837 2.530 2.230 0.000 24.000 
nbgrant3t-2 5837 12.153 10.410 1.000 111.000 
avergrant3t-2 5837 229233.300 662241.400 0.000 15900000.000 
nbgrant5t-2 5837 18.905 16.009 1.000 162.000 
avergrant5t-2 5837 201779.500 491197.600 71.010 9722040.000 
nbcont3t-1 5837 2.302 6.009 0.000 136.000 
avercont3t-1 5837 55396.680 404118.300 0.000 11600000.000 
104 x averbetcentind3t-1 5806 7.922 17.022 0.000 268.432 
103 x cliquind3t-2 5806 27.072 29.289 0.000 341.589 
104 x averdegcentind3t-1 5806 5.370 5.375 0.000 52.588 
104 x averdegcentind5t-1 5807 6.095 5.853 0.000 52.612 
 
Table 4 –  Correlation Matrix 
Variables   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
ln(nbcit5t) 1 1.000            
nbpapert 2 0.501 1.000           
nbgrant3t-2 3 0.129 0.183 1.000          
ln(avergrant3t-2) 4 0.080 0.113 0.547 1.000         
nbgrant5t-2 5 0.119 0.192 0.962 0.539 1.000        
ln(avergrant5t-2) 6 0.084 0.125 0.548 0.961 0.562 1.000       
nbcont3t-1 7 0.011 0.080 0.280 0.144 0.308 0.161 1.000      
ln(avercont3t-1) 8 0.023 0.136 0.352 0.246 0.377 0.264 0.544 1.000     
104 x averbetcentind3t-1 9 0.248 0.463 0.105 0.078 0.107 0.088 0.008 0.056 1.000    
103 x cliquind3t-2 10 0.148 0.194 0.067 0.038 0.066 0.048 0.012 0.061 0.299 1.000   
104 x averdegcentind3t-1 11 0.317 0.516 0.171 0.118 0.176 0.131 0.038 0.112 0.812 0.553 1.000  




Table 5 – Random-effects regression results – natural log of the number of citations five-years after 
publication (with interactive dummies on contracts for 1991-1993) 
 (7’)  (8’)  (9’)  (10’)  (11’)  (12’)  
averpapert 
0.1875 *** 0.1965 *** 0.2675 *** 0.1883 *** 0.1973 *** 0.2686 *** 
(0.0234)  (0.0228)  (0.0230)  (0.0235)  (0.0229)  (0.0230)  
nbpapert - averpapert 
0.2059 *** 0.2066 *** 0.2054 *** 0.2061 *** 0.2069 *** 0.2057 *** 
(0.0081)  (0.0081)  (0.0081)  (0.0081)  (0.0081)  (0.0081)  
nbgrant3t-2 
0.0038 * 0.0039 * 0.0039 *       
(0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0022)        
nbgrant5t-2 
      0.0021  0.0022  0.0022  
      (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0015)  
ln(avergrant3t-2) 
-0.0031  -0.0036  -0.0049        
(0.0065)  (0.0065)  (0.0065)        
ln(avergrant5t-2) 
      -0.0056  -0.0061  -0.0072  
      (0.0068)  (0.0068)  (0.0069)  
nbcont3t-1 
-0.0019  -0.0019  -0.0020  -0.0018  -0.0018  -0.0019  
(0.0037)  (0.0038)  (0.0038)  (0.0038)  (0.0038)  (0.0038)  
ln(avercont3t-1) 
-0.0025  -0.0025  -0.0018  -0.0021  -0.0021  -0.0014  
(0.0042)  (0.0042)  (0.0043)  (0.0042)  (0.0043)  (0.0043)  
nbcont3t-1 x d9193 
-0.0065  -0.0064  -0.0062  -0.0064  -0.0064  -0.0061  
(0.0141)  (0.0141)  (0.0141)  (0.0141)  (0.0141)  (0.0141)  
ln(avercont3t-1) x d9193 
-0.0037  -0.0023  -0.0052  -0.0037  -0.0023  -0.0052  
(0.0102)  (0.0102)  (0.0102)  (0.0102)  (0.0102)  (0.0102)  
104 x averdegcentind3t-1 
0.0450 ***     0.0450 ***     
(0.0089)      (0.0089)      
104 x (degcentind3t-1 - averdegcentind3t-
1 
-0.0085 *     -0.0084 *     
(0.0047)      (0.0047)      
104 x averdegcentind5t-1 
  0.0361 ***     0.0362 ***   
  (0.0076)      (0.0076)    
104 x (degcentind5t-1 – averdegcentind5t-
1 
  -0.0124 **     -0.0122 **   
  (0.0051)      (0.0051)    
104 x averbetcentind3t-1 
    0.0016      0.0016  
    (0.0029)      (0.0029)  
104 x (betcentind3t-1 - averbetcentind3t-1 
    -0.0023 *     -0.0023 * 
    (0.0012)      (0.0012)  
ln(103 x cliquind3t-2) 
0.0232  0.0257  0.0410 ** 0.0240  0.0265  0.0418 *** 
(0.0195)  (0.0196)  (0.0185)  (0.0195)  (0.0196)  (0.0185)  
dULaval 
-0.0472  -0.0471  -0.0679  -0.0461  -0.0460  -0.0665  
(0.0626)  (0.0627)  (0.0640)  (0.0627)  (0.0628)  (0.0640)  
dMcGill 
0.2221 *** 0.2199 *** 0.2175 *** 0.2230 *** 0.2208 *** 0.2186 *** 
(0.0603)  (0.0604)  (0.0617)  (0.0604)  (0.0605)  (0.0618)  
dConcordia 
0.1528  0.1712  0.1863  0.1481  0.1664  0.1825  
(0.1505)  (0.1507)  (0.1558)  (0.1508)  (0.1510)  (0.1561)  
dSherbrookeBishop 
-0.1382  -0.1385  -0.1478  -0.1362  -0.1365  -0.1457  
(0.0891)  (0.0893)  (0.0910)  (0.0893)  (0.0894)  (0.0911)  
dUQuebec 
-0.1981 *** -0.1975 *** -0.2102 *** -0.1969 *** -0.1964 *** -0.2088 *** 
(0.0757)  (0.0758)  (0.0771)  (0.0757)  (0.0759)  (0.0772)  
d1985-1995 
-0.2963 *** -0.3019 *** -0.2745 *** -0.2965 *** -0.3020 *** -0.2741 *** 
(0.0548)  (0.0549)  (0.0551)  (0.0552)  (0.0552)  (0.0554)  
constant 
2.5830 *** 2.5797 *** 2.5730 *** 2.6075 *** 2.6040 *** 2.5941 *** 
(0.0945)  (0.0950)  (0.0970)  (0.0961)  (0.0966)  (0.0987)  
             
σu 0.4813  0.4841  0.5064  0.4832  0.4857  0.5077  
σe 0.7892  0.7889  0.7891  0.7892  0.7889  0.7890  
ρ 0.2711  0.2735  0.2917  0.2727  0.2749  0.2928  
22 
 
 (7’)  (8’)  (9’)  (10’)  (11’)  (12’)  
             
n 3400  3400  3400  3402  3402  3402  
ngroups 748  748  748  748  748  748  
average nb years 4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5  
max nb years 16  16  16  16  16  16  
R2 within 0.1971  0.1978  0.1968  0.1971  0.1977  0.1968  
R2 between 0.3722  0.3694  0.3422  0.3722  0.3695  0.3423  
R2 overall 0.3343  0.3336  0.3296  0.3334  0.3328  0.3287  
υi~Gaussian Wald χ
2(17) 1166.4  1163.29  1114.25  1164.54  1161.7  1113.12  
corr(υi,X) 0  0  0  0  0  0  
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 Standard errors are presented in parentheses 
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